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I. Introduction  
In recent years the western U.S. has seen an increase in the both the frequency and severity of 
wildland fires.  Statistics from the past five years on acres and homes burned (Table 1) provide a 
stark illustration of the impact these fires have had on the landscape.  In 2003, for example, over 
4,500 homes in the United States were destroyed by wildland fires, nearly all of them during the 
October fires in southern California, resulting in more than two billion U.S. dollars in damages 
(NIFC 2007).  These fires have continued to burn in spite of the billions of dollars federal agencies 
spend on fire suppression.  A steady increase in the number of individuals living in and around 
forested areas (Stewart et al. 2005) has added to the complexity and immediacy of the wildfire 
problem.  If wildfire risk is not considered by individuals and communities in fire-prone areas, 
values at risk of damage and destruction by wildfire will continue increasing and public expenditures 
will remain ineffective. 
 
  Table  1:  Wildfire  statistics 
Year Suppression  Cost 
(billions) 
Acres Burned  Homes burned 
2002 $1.66  6,937,584  4,184 
2003 $1.32  4,918,088  4,508 
2004 $.89  6,790,692  315 
2005 $.87  8,686,153  402 
2006 ----  9,873,745  750 
 Source: National Interagency Coordination Center at the National Interagency Fire Center. 
 
Because wildfire responds to changes in the amount and configuration of fuels, a forest can be 
managed through the use of various hazardous fuel reduction treatments
1 to minimize wildfire risk 
(van Wagtendonk 1996; Graham et al. 1999; Hirsch and Pengelly 1999; Pollet and Omi 2002; Agee 
and Skinner 2006).  However, because wildfire moves across a landscape and across property 
boundaries, the risk an individual faces is a function of fuel reduction decisions made by both the 
individual owner and other landowners.  Because both individual and collective actions affect 
wildfire risk, this problem is well suited to game theory and the analysis of strategic behavior.   
                                                 
1 We do not distinguish between different types of fuel reduction treatments (e.g. prescribed fire versus mechanical 
thinning); instead we use a general measure of “fuel reduction effort.”   3
 
When deciding where to spend fuel reduction effort, public land management agencies must 
consider values at risk in the wildland urban interface (WUI), where public and private land is 
intermixed, as well as values at risk on public land outside the WUI.  In the WUI, the extent of 
wildfire damage depends on both the self-protection actions taken by the private owners and those 
taken by neighboring public forest managers.  Within this context, we examine how a public land 
management agency’s investment in fuel reduction both within and outside the WUI influences, and 
is influenced by, decisions made by a private land owner within the WUI. 
 
The disinterest in self-protection against natural hazards even when it is cost-effective has been 
observed for other hazards (Kunreuther 2000).  Failure to self-protect against wildfire damage may 
be due to a variety of factors: lack of information regarding the occurrence and severity of wildfires, 
the probability or potential damage from a wildfire, risk attitude, a disinclination to worry about low 
probability hazards, or government provision of disaster relief (Kunreuther and Slovic 1978; Lewis 
and Nickerson 1989; McGee 2006).  In an attempt to force private land owners in the WUI to self-
protect, some states have begun requiring fuel treatment on private land.   Montana, Minnesota, New 
Mexico and Washington statutory law require landowners to reduce excessive fuel loads to reduce 
the possibility of wildfires (Yoder et al. 2004).  In a similar move, Oregon passed the Oregon 
Forestland-Urban Interface Fire Protection Act in 1997 and the associated administrative rules in 
2002, which will become effective in 2007.  However, these laws remain the exception rather than 
the rule and the extent to which they will be enforced is uncertain.  In general, public land 
management agencies alone fund fuel reduction projects on public, and in some cases on private, 
forest land in addition to funding all wildfire suppression effort. 
 
The Healthy Forest Restoration Act (2003) requires that at least fifty percent of funding for 
hazardous fuel reduction projects be used in the WUI.  This policy has had a noticeable impact on 
the distribution of fuel treatments across the western U.S.  For example, in FY2006 fuel treatments 
conducted under the HFRA on USFS land in Montana totaled 42,304 acres in the WUI and 18,263 
acres outside the WUI (www.healthyforests.gov/projects/montana.html.  Feb. 3, 2007).  Because 
there are far more acres outside the WUI, the difference between the two figures is even more   4
pronounced when treatment in the WUI as a fraction of total acres in the WUI is compared to 
treatment outside the WUI as a fraction of total acres outside the WUI.     
Fuel reduction is a form of hazard mitigation and has public good characteristics: it is non-rival and 
non-excludable.   If an individual expends fuel reduction effort on her property, then wildfire risk is 
reduced on both the individual’s property and on neighboring properties.  Furthermore, the 
individual cannot exclude neighbors from benefiting from, or “free riding,” on her effort.  Reddy 
(2000) examines hurricane damage mitigation as a public good and identifies the institutional 
characteristics that minimize free riding and promote sustainable development.  Varian (2004) and 
Hirshleifer (1983) use game theory to examine public good provision and evaluate three alternative 
technologies – total effort, weakest link, and best shot – that relate individual effort to improvements 
in provision of the good.  Because fuel reduction effort both on an individual plot and on the 
surrounding landscape affects wildfire risk (Hann and Strohm 2003), especially in the case of large 
wildfires (Finney 2001; Gill and Bradstock 1998), we employ the total effort technology, in which 
public good provision depends on the sum of the efforts exerted by the individuals. 
 
Despite the characteristics of wildfire risk WUI that make game theory appropriate (i.e., both 
individual and collective actions affect wildfire risk), only Amacher et al. (2006) use game theory to 
explore the interaction between a public agency and a private land owner in the context of wildfire.  
They use a stand level model to analyze the strategic interaction between government and a private 
land owner, but focus only on the management of private land.  In their model the government 
chooses level of suppression and the private land owner chooses the level of fuel reduction effort.  
Because public fuels treatment and suppression decisions are typically unrelated in practice, here we 
focus on the interaction between public and private land owners in their choices about fuel and risk 
reduction efforts.  The public land manager considers values in the WUI and outside the WUI and 
determines how to allocate fuels treatment effort across the landscape.  The private landowner 
chooses effort only in the WUI.  We use this model of strategic interaction between the public land 
manager and the private land owner in their choice of fuel reduction effort to analyze the impact of 
federal disaster relief and evaluate the current government policy of focusing fire-risk mitigating 
activities in the WUI.  We find that both federal disaster relief and increases in public land 
management agency’s spending on fuel reduction effort in the WUI increases private land owner’s 
ability to free ride and may result in inefficiently low levels of fuel reduction effort outside the WUI.   5
 
The basic model used to analyze the wildfire risk management problem is described in section II.  
We being Section II with a description of the social planner’s fuel reduction decision and then define 
the public land manager’s and private land owner’s decisions.  In section III the strategic interaction 
between the players is made explicit and the results of the game theoretic model are described.  We 
examine the impact of federal disaster relief in section IV.  In section V we discuss the degree of free 




Landscape.  We model a landscape with two general areas: outside the WUI and the WUI.  The area 
outside the WUI is comprised of public land only and the public landowner, “Public,” chooses the 
amount of fuel reduction effort there.  The WUI includes a mix of public and private land and both 
Public and the private landowner, “Private,” choose their own level of fuel reduction effort there.  
Total effort in the WUI is the sum of Public and Private effort.  We assume the forest fuel conditions 
are the same both in and outside the WUI. 
 
Fire.  Fuel reduction effort (e) reduces the amount, and alters the arrangement, of forest fuels 
thereby decreasing the intensity and spread rate of fires.  With less intense, smaller fires the 
probability that values in the area survive a fire increases.  For example, a high intensity fire could 
kill all the standing trees and thereby destroy both timber and environmental service values while a 
low intensity fire could kill only the low shrubs and debris without damaging timber and 
environmental service values.  The parameter “fire resistance,” π, describes the probability that 
values survive a fire and is determined by fuel reduction effort, e, in that area.
2  For the fire 
resistance parameter we have π'(e)>0 and π''(e)<0 where prime denotes the derivative with respect 
to effort, e.  The first and second order derivatives imply that as effort increases fire resistance 
increases, but at a decreasing rate.  The fuel reduction effort, e, describes the total effort for a given 
                                                 
2 The probability of ignition is exogenous of effort and assumed to be equal in and outside the WUI.  The focus of our 
paper is on the value remaining post-fire.   6
area – WUI or outside the WUI – regardless of who performs that effort.   Throughout the paper we 
assume a constant cost of fuels reduction effort.
3   
 
II. A. Social Optimum 
In order to compare the fuel reduction effort that arises in equilibrium from the game between 
Private and Public to the socially optimal level of effort, first we solve the Social Planner’s problem: 
)} ( ) ( ) ( ) ( { , , , , , ,
, , max
, ,
p w g o g p w g p w g o g o g
e e e
e e e c e e A v A e A
p w g o g
+ + − + + + + π π  
Where 
effort reduction    fuel   of cost  unit 
 WUI in the    value Private
 WUI in the   lue amenity va   Private
 WUI in the   lue amenity va   Public
 WUI  the outside   lue amenity va   Public
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The social planner chooses the level of three types of effort (e) that depict the provider and location 
of that effort.  Similarly, the social planner receives amenity values from three sources.  The first 
subscripts on effort, e, and amenity value, A, indicate whether the parameter is associated with 
Public (g) or Private (p) and the second subscript describes whether the parameter represents 
value/effort in the WUI (w) or outside the WUI (o).  Private effort and amenity value have only one 
subscript because we assume Private has no amenity values outside the WUI and, therefore, does not 
spend effort outside the WUI.  Amenity value includes resource values such as scenic views, clean 
air, and other nonmarket ecosystem services.  Private value (v) represents uninsured private property 
                                                 
3 For simplicity we assume the cost of fuel reduction effort is equal in the WUI and away from the WUI and equal for 
Public and Private.  However, the cost of fuel reduction effort may be greater in the WUI due to extra precaution that 
must be taken to protect private property or higher transaction costs associated with planning and implementing projects 
in areas of mixed ownership.  If the cost of fuel reduction effort in the WUI is greater, then the MNB of effort in the 
WUI decrease for all levels of effort and Public would want to shift effort away from the WUI.   7
value such as timber or a home in the WUI.  The first order conditions for the maximization of the 


























The first order conditions state that fuels reduction effort should be spent in each area up to the point 
where the marginal net benefit (MNB) of effort is equal to the marginal cost (MC) of effort.  The 
social planner is indifferent about which actor performs the effort. 
 
II.b. Public land manager’s decision 
Public’s problem is to choose the optimal level of fuel reduction effort to maximize the expected 
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Where φ is the fraction of the private property value for which Public has liability and ep is Private’s 
fuel reduction effort, which we assume to be fixed (at zero or some positive level) for now.  In 2000, 
fire burned a total of a third of a million acres in the Bitterroot National Forest (containing both WUI 
and non-WUI areas) and on private property including 52 homes, 23 other buildings, and 2 sawmills.  
As a result of the destruction, 113 individuals filed tort claims against the USFS seeking $54 million 
in damages (Ring 2003), indicating the relevance of public liability for private losses.
4 
 
Public values in the WUI include amenity values in addition to private property value for which 
Public is liable.  Public values outside the WUI include amenity values such as endangered species 
habitat, biodiversity, and watershed protection.  Amenity values outside the WUI include wildlife 
                                                 
4 Wildfire statistics for Oregon and Washington from the Northwest Interagency Coordination Center indicate that most 
wildfire ignite on public land and spread to private land.  For this reason, we focus on Public liability for Private values 
and do not consider Private liability for Public values.   8
habitat, scenic views, and recreation sites.  Though fire is a natural part of Western landscapes, 
current fuel loads contribute to conditions that can create uncharacteristic and catastrophic fires.  For 
example, in the summer of 2002, the Hayman Fire destroyed thousands of acres of threatened and 
endangered species habitat affecting the Mexican spotted Owl, Bald eagle, Preble’s Meadow 
Jumping Mouse, and Canada lynx habitat (Laverty 2003).   
 
The first order condition for the maximization of Public’s problem when the private actor performs 
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This condition states that at the optimal level of fuel reduction effort, the marginal benefit of effort in 
the WUI is equal to the marginal benefit of effort outside the WUI.  For the case where Public’s 
values at risk, which include both public amenity values and private property value for which Public 
is liable, and the cost of fuel reduction effort in both areas are equal, Public optimally spends an 
equal amount of effort in the WUI and outside the WUI. 
 
When Public’s value in the WUI is greater than value outside the WUI, it is optimal for Public to 
spend more effort in the WUI.  If Public’s budget constraint is binding such that the MNB of the last 
unit of effort in the WUI is greater than the MNB of the first unit of effort outside the WUI, Public 
optimally spends effort only in the WUI.  However, the opposite outcome can also arise.  When the 
MNB of the last unit of effort outside the WUI is greater than the MNB of the first unit of effort in 
the WUI, Public optimally spends all fuel reduction effort outside the WUI. 
 
To comply with a state regulation or to protect their property from wildfire damage, Private could 
spend an exogenously determined, positive amount of fuel reduction effort in the WUI  ) ( p e .   In this 
case fire resistance in the WUI depends on the sum of Public’s and Private’s fuel reduction efforts, 
whereas fire resistance outside the WUI remains a function of Public effort alone.  Here Public’s 
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This condition states that at the optimal level of fuel reduction effort, the marginal benefit of effort in 
the WUI is equal to the marginal benefit of effort outside the WUI, taking Private effort as given.  
Because we assume fire resistance is an increasing, strictly concave function of fuel reduction effort, 
any positive amount of Private effort in the WUI will reduce the MNB derived from Public effort.  
Therefore, as Private effort in the WUI increases, the optimal level of Public effort decreases and 
Public free-rides on Private’s public good provision in the WUI.  With a budget constraint for 
Public, this free riding increases the funding available for fuel reduction effort outside the WUI.  If 
Public values at risk in and outside the WUI are equal, then whenever Private has a positive level of 
effort in the WUI, Public optimally spends more effort outside the WUI than in it. 
 
II. C. Private land owner’s decision 
Up to this point the private land owner’s fuel reduction decision has been exogenously determined.  
In reality, however, private land owner’s decisions are made simultaneously with Public’s decision 
and each player’s choice influences the other’s optimal fuel reduction choice.  In order to model the 
strategic interaction between the two players, first it is necessary to specify the private land owner’s 
fuel reduction decision. 
 
Private’s objective is to choose the optimal level of fuel reduction effort to maximize expected value 
taking Public’s choice of effort as given -- this is the flipside of Public’s problem.  Private’s 
optimization problem is specified as follows:   10
0
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Private value “at risk” ( v ) 1 ( φ − ) is the fraction of total private property value uncompensated by 
Public liability.  Value “at risk” will be greater when the Public player has little or no liability for 
private property value. 
 













This condition states that at the optimal level of fuel reduction effort, the MNB of total effort in the 
WUI is equal to the MC of effort, given Public’s choice of effort. 
 
Differences in the Public’s and Private’s WUI values will create a divergence in the desired level of 
fuel reduction effort in the WUI.  If Public’s WUI values ) ( , v A w g φ + are greater than Private’s WUI 
values ) ) 1 ( ( v Ap φ − + , then Public is willing to spend more fuel reduction effort than Private to 
protect those values at risk.  Similarly, when Private values in the WUI are greater, Private is willing 
to spend more fuel reduction effort than Public.  
 
III. Results 
III.a. Public and Private’s Strategic Interaction 
A strategic interaction between the Public and Private players in the fuel reduction effort decision 
arises because each landowner’s decision affects the other landowner’s decision. Because fuels 
reduction effort has public good characteristics, one landowner’s effort creates a disincentive for the 
other’s effort.  We model the strategic interaction between the two “players” as a single stage   11
simultaneous move game with perfect information.  In this game players make their strategy choices 
simultaneously, without knowing the strategy choices that have been chosen by the other player.  
Although neither player knows what the other will actually choose, perfect information implies that 
the strategic choices and values at risk available to each player are known by all players.  Players 
must determine both their own best strategic choice and the best strategic choice of the other player. 
 
For each player we identify the “best response” of each player to the strategy choice of the other 
player.  The best response to all possible strategy choices of the other player is termed the response 
function.  The response function for Public gives the optimal fuel reduction effort as a function of 
Private’s effort.  Similarly, the response function for Private gives the optimal fuel reduction effort 
as a function of Public’s effort.  When each player’s strategy choice is a best response to the strategy 
choice of the other player, we have a Nash equilibrium (NE).  Graphically, the NE exists where the 
two response functions intersect.  
 
To derive the response functions we use a general functional form for fire resistance.
5  Fuel 
reduction effort in the WUI is considered a public good and individual actors make decisions based 
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5 We let fire resistance equal the natural log of total effort in the area: ) ln( ) ( e e = π , which satisfies  0 ) ( ' > e π and 
0 ) ( ' ' < e π .   12
The response functions for each player are derived by solving the player’s optimization problem in 
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These equations demonstrate that as Public’s contribution of effort increases, Private’s contribution 
decreases, and vice versa.  Graphed on a two-dimensional plane with Public effort on the x-axis and 
Private effort on the y-axis, each player’s response function is downward sloping (Figures 1a and 



















, is greater than the slope of 
Private’s response function (-1), Public’s response function is always steeper than Private’s response 
function
6.  The individual player’s optimal choice of effort is decreasing function of the other 
player’s choice of effort.  A kink occurs in the response functions when it becomes optimal for the 
                                                 
6 This will not hold for cases where Public is not budget constrained, which we will discuss in the next section. 
ep =  Private effort 
eg,w = Public effort 
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Figure1a:  Public’s Best response function Figure1b:  Private’s Best response function 
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player to choose zero effort.  Each player’s maximum amount of effort is a best response when the 
other player chooses zero effort. 
 
Solving the system of equations defined by the response functions, we can determine each player’s 
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Optimal contributions of effort depend on Public’s budget (B), the assignment of liability(φ ), and 
Public and Private values in and outside the WUI.  As these parameters vary, interaction between the 
two players may differ.  We consider strategic interaction between Public and Private in two general 
cases: (1) when Public is budget constrained and (2) when Public is not budget constrained. 
 
III.b. Public is Budget Constrained 
For the cases where Public is budget constrained there are three possible NE.  The first two are 
extreme free riding outcomes where only one player contributes effort and the third is a shared effort 
equilibrium.  Varian (1994) finds that in a game with two or more agents and the “total effort 
technology,” public good provision is determined by the agent with the highest benefit-cost ratio and 
all other agents free ride on this agent.  Our first two NE constitute a similar, extreme free riding 
result.  However, our problem is distinct in that we have two players with different benefit functions 
– Public values fire resistance in the WUI and outside the WUI while Private is concerned only with 
fire resistance in the WUI.  Because of this difference, the equilibria that emerge from the game are 
not limited to the extreme free riding result observed when both players’ utility takes a quasilinear 
form, as described in Varian (1994).  In the results described below, first we look at the conditions 
that lead to each of the three equilibria when public and private WUI values are equal.  Next we look 
at the case where public and private WUI values are not equal.   14
 
i.  Public and Private WUI Values Are Equal 
When Public and Private WUI values are equal (i.e., v A v A p w g ) 1 ( , φ φ − + = + ) the optimal level of 
total effort in the WUI is the same for both players.  However, Public faces a budget constraint and 
must decide where to spend limited funds: in or outside the WUI.  Of the three possible NE, the 
equilibrium that emerges will depend on the size of Public’s budget.  When the x-intercept of 
Public’s response function is at or to the right of the kink in Private’s response function, 
or v A A B w g o g φ + + ≥ , , , the extreme free riding equilibrium with only Public contributing effort 
emerges (Figure 2a).  In this case, Public’s budget constraint is not binding and funds are large 
enough to protect values in and outside the WUI. 
 
When the y-intercept of Private’s response function is at or above the kink in Public’s an extreme 
free riding equilibrium will emerge with only Private contributing fuel reduction effort in the WUI 
(Figure 2b).  At this equilibrium Public spends the entire budget outside the WUI and free rides on 
Private effort in the WUI.  This equilibrium is most likely to emerge when Public’s budget is less 
than or equal to the amenity value outside the WUI (i.e., o g A B , ≤ ), or when the Public budget is 
small and Public amenity value outside the WUI is great. 
 
Finally, the shared effort equilibrium will emerge (Figure 2c) when Public’s budget is between the 
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Figure 2a:   
Extreme free riding equilibrium 
 
Figure 2b: 
Extreme free riding equilibrium 
Figure 2c: 
Shared effort equilibrium   15
and outside the WUI, but greater than values outside the WUI (i.e., v A A B A w g o g o g φ + + ≤ ≤ , , , ).  The 
greater Public’s budget within this range the more effort Public contributes.  
 
ii.  Public and Private WUI Values Are Not Equal 
When Public and Private WUI values are not equal (i.e., ) 1 ( , φ φ − + ≠ + p w g A v A ) the two players 
optimal total amounts of fuel reduction in the WUI are different.  In this case, the three possible NE 
are the same as when Public and Private WUI values are equal, but the conditions that produce these 
outcomes are different.  Here the equilibrium that emerges will depend on the size of Public’s budget 
(B), the players’ relative values in the WUI and, Public’s relative values in the WUI and outside the 
WUI.  
 
The first equilibrium characterized by extreme free riding, where Public does everything (Figure 2a), 
will emerge when the x-intercept of Public’s response function is to the right of the kink in Private’s 
response function; when
v A
v A A v A
B
w g
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.  Here Public has a large enough 
budget to spend the desired amount of effort outside the WUI and spend at least as much effort in the 
WUI as desired by Private.  This condition is most likely to hold when Private’s values in the WUI 
( v Ap ) 1 ( φ − + ) are low, Public’s budget (B) is large, and/or Public’s values outside the WUI ( o g A , ) 
are low.  
 
At other parameter values, a different NE arises in which Private contributes effort in the WUI and 
Public contributes no effort (Figure 2b).  This equilibrium, also characterized by extreme free riding, 
will emerge when the y-intercept of Private’s response function is above the kink in Public’s 














.  At this equilibrium, Public is so severely budget constrained that the player 
can afford only minimal effort in the WUI.  Private, however, desires and can afford a much greater 
amount of effort.  At this much higher level of Private effort, Public effort is zero.  This outcome is 
most likely to occur when Public budgets are small, Private values in the WUI are large relative to   16
Public values, and Public value outside the WUI is large.  At this equilibrium, Public spends effort 
outside the WUI only.   
 
Finally, at other parameter values, a third NE exists where both Public and Private spend effort in the 
WUI (Figure 2c).  This equilibrium emerges when Private’s response function intersects the vertical 
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.  Here Public’s budget constraint 
is binding, but is within a range that allows the players to split effort in the WUI.  Because the slope 
of Private’s response function is equal to negative one and every unit of Public fuel reduction effort 
crowds out Private effort, one-for-one. 
 
All three NE are stable.  At points to the left of the NE, Public increases effort until the equilibrium 
is reached.  This is because at points to the left of the NE Public is not satisfied with total effort and 
requires more effort from Private than Private is willing to spend.  At points to the right of the NE, 
Private is not satisfied with total effort and requires more effort from Public than Public is willing to 
spend.  In this case Private increases effort until the equilibrium is reached.   
 
III.c. Public is Not Budget Constrained 
When Public is not budget constrained, the players’ response functions are parallel.  Without a 
budget constraint, Public has sufficient funding for fuel reductions in both areas and no longer has to 
tradeoff between fuel reduction effort within and outside the WUI.  When the Public and Private 
WUI values are equal ( v A v A p w g ) 1 ( , φ φ − + = + ), the two response functions overlap and there are 
infinitely many NE.  Because the players have the same amount of value at risk in the WUI, each 
player values improvements in WUI fire resistance equally.   
 
Figure 3:  Overlapping Best response functions   17
 
In the case where the Public and Private WUI values are not equal, there are two possible equilibria.  
Relative values in the WUI will determine which of the extreme free riding equilibria emerges.  If 
Private values are greater than Public values in the WUI, then Private will contribute effort equal to 
( v Ap ) 1 ( φ − + )/c and Public will contribute nothing.  If the opposite is true, then Public will 
contribute effort equal to ( v A w g φ + , )/c in the WUI and Private will contribute nothing.  At both 
equilibria, Public spends the efficient level of effort outside the WUI. 
 
IV. Federal Disaster Relief 
After destructive wildfires, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides aid to 
individuals affected by the wildfire.  Federal disaster relief from FEMA is greatest for individuals in 
areas that are declared a disaster area by the President, where property damage is not covered or 
insufficiently covered by insurance,
7 and the individual is a citizen of the U.S. 
                                                 
7 An examination of the insurance decision is beyond the scope of the present analysis, but will be addressed in future 
work. 
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Figure 4b: Public WUI values greater  Figure 4a: Private WUI values greater   18
(http:www.fema.gov/assistance/process/qualify_other_housing.shtm.  Aug. 22, 2006).  In this 
section we introduce federal disaster relief into the model and examine the impact on equilibrium 
fuels reduction effort. With disaster relief, Private’s problem becomes: 
0
. .
} ) ( ) ) 1 )( 1 ( {( , max
≥
− + − − +
p
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relief   federal by    d compensate    value of Fraction  = θ  
 
Disaster relief is essentially federal liability for private property values; it reduces the amount of 
private property value at risk to Private.  The introduction of federal relief causes Private’s response 
function to shift down and to the left in parallel fashion, as illustrated in Figure 6.  With less value at 
risk, the private player has less incentive to contribute fuel reduction effort.  Given the new response 
function, for any level of Public fuel reduction effort in the WUI Private will contribute less effort.  
At the new equilibrium, Public fuel reduction effort is greater and Private effort is reduced.  
However, because the slope of Public’s response function is steeper, Public’s increase in fuel 
reduction effort will not be enough to off-set the reduction in Private effort and total effort in the 
WUI will decrease.  Furthermore, as public spending in the WUI increases, a smaller portion of the 
total budget is available for fuel reduction effort outside the WUI. 
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V. Discussion 
Using the results derived in the previous sections we can compare the equilibrium outcomes to the 
socially efficient outcomes inside and outside the WUI, evaluate the impact of the Healthy Forest 
Restoration Act (HFRA) on fuel reduction effort, and identify the policies and characterize the 
settings that limit Private’s ability to free ride.  Total effort in the WUI is calculated at the 
intersection of the response functions.  Total effort outside the WUI is calculated by subtracting the 
cost of Public effort in the WUI from the budget and dividing the remaining budget by the cost of 
fuel reduction effort.  These calculations are described for all cases in Table 2. 
 
Effort in the WUI.  Because fuel reduction effort is a public good, strategic interaction in the WUI 
will always lead to a socially suboptimal, or inefficient, level of effort in the WUI due to the free 
rider problem.  The inefficiency results because neither player considers the full value of amenities 
and private property in the WUI.  Public considers only public amenity value and public liability 
( v A w g φ + , ).  Similarly, Private considers only private amenity value and private liability 
( v Ap ) 1 ( φ − + ).  The socially optimal level of effort in the WUI considers all values in the area and 
is equal to ( v A A w g p + + , )/c, as described in Table 2.  Federal disaster relief leads to even greater 
inefficiencies because Private considers an even smaller fraction of property value “at risk.” 
 
Even when Public is not budget constrained, effort in the WUI remains suboptimal.  In this case, the 
amount of effort spent in the WUI is equal to either ( v Ap ) 1 ( φ − + )/c or ( v A w g φ + , )/c, whichever is 
greater (see Figures 4a and 4b).  Without the assignment of full liability to one of the players and full 
consideration of total amenity values fuel reduction in the WUI will remain inefficiently low.  This 
result also holds in the case where Public is not budget constrained and WUI values are equal. 
 
Effort Outside the WUI.   Public carries full responsibility for the protection of amenity values 
outside the WUI but decisions about that area are tied, through the budget constraint, to decisions 
within the WUI.  The socially optimal amount of effort outside the WUI is equal to
c
A o g, , where the 
MNB of the last unit of effort is equal to its MC.  However, the level of effort Public spends outside 
the WUI depends on the budget, liability, and on relative amenity values in and outside the WUI and   20
on which equilibrium emerges.  When Public is budget constrained, limited funds must be divided 
between the two areas.  The players’ response functions indicate that increases in Public’s budget (B) 
lead to increases in Public effort and decreases in Private effort, or an increase Private’s ability to 
free ride.  Figure 7 illustrates how effort by both players changes with Public’s budget.  Given the 
parameter values used in Figure 7, the socially optimal levels of effort are 40 in the WUI and 10 
outside the WUI.  To isolate the effect of Public’s budget on fuel reduction effort, we chose the same 
parameter values for Public values in the WUI and Public values outside the WUI, though this point 
could be illustrated if these values were not equal. 
 





































Public Effort Outside WUI Public Effort in the WUI
Private Effort in the WUI Socially Optimal Effort in the WUI
Socially Optimal Effort Outside the WUI Total Effort in the WUI
*Equilibrium effort levels depicted are calculated using the following parameter values: Ag,o =1; Ag,w=1; Ap=1; 
φ=0.5; v=2; c=0.1. 
 
For the parameter values above, when Public’s budget (B) is between zero and one, the extreme free 
riding equilibrium where only Private spends effort in the WUI emerges and Public spends the entire 
budget outside the WUI.  When Public’s budget is between one and three, Public increases effort in 
the WUI and Private matches with equivalent reductions in effort.  When Public’s budget is greater   21
than three, the opposite extreme free riding equilibrium results in which only Public contributes 
effort in the WUI.  It is important to note that whatever Public’s budget, total effort in the WUI is 
half the socially optimal level of effort due to the free-rider problem. 
 
The relationship between effort and Public liability is illustrated in Figure 8.  To isolate the effect of 
Public’s fraction of liability on equilibrium fuel reduction effort, we chose the same parameter 
values for Public values in the WUI and Public values outside the WUI (Ap=Ag,w).  As Public’s 
fraction of liability increases, Public effort in the WUI increases and Private effort in the WUI 
decreases, as Private’s ability to free ride increases.  Once liability exceeds 0.5, Public effort in the 
WUI displaces effort outside the WUI. 
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Public Effort Outside the WUI Public Effort in the WUI
Private Effort in the WUI Socially Optimal Effort in the WUI
Socially Optimal Effort Outside the WUI Total Effort in the WUI
 
*Equilibrium effort levels depicted are calculated using the following parameter values: Ag,o =1; Ag,w=1; Ap=1; 
B=2; v=2; c=0.1.   22
 
Given the parameter values used in Figure 8, the socially optimal levels of effort are 40 in the WUI 
and 10 outside the WUI.  Equilibrium effort in the WUI is closest to the social optimum when 
Private has full liability.  Equilibrium effort outside the WUI is equal to the social optimum when 
Public liability within the WUI is less than or equal to 0.5. 
 
The degree of inefficiency in fuel reduction effort outside the WUI is most severe when Public 
values outside the WUI are high relative to Public values in the WUI and Public liability in the WUI 
is high.  In that case, increases in Public’s budget do not necessarily lead to increases in spending 
outside the WUI nor total effort in the WUI (Figure 9).  As Public’s budget increases from two to 
four, Public spends all additional funds in the WUI while Private reduces effort.  Public values 
outside the WUI are neglected as Private’s free riding in the WUI increases.  Given the parameter 
values used in Figure 9, the socially optimal levels of effort are 40 in the WUI – which is not 
attained at any budget level – and 40 outside the WUI – which is not attained until B reaches 6.75. 
 
Figure 9: How effort changes with Public’s budget when WUI values are not equal and values outside the WUI 






































Public Effort Outside WUI Public Effort in WUI
Private Effort in WUI Socially Optimal Effort In and Outside the WUI
Total Effort in the WUI
 
*Equilibrium effort levels depicted are calculated using the following parameter values: Ag,o =4; Ag,w=1; Ap=1; 
φ=0.8; v=2; c=0.1. 
 
Not surprisingly, when Public is not budget constrained, fuel reduction effort outside the WUI is 
socially optimal for the all cases.  However, for the cases where Public is budget constrained and 
WUI values are equal, the socially optimal level of effort outside the WUI is observed as long 
as o g A B , > .  Similarly, for the case where Public is budget constrained and WUI values are not 
equal, we observe the socially optimal level of effort outside the WUI as long 
as
) (












> .  In both cases, sufficiently large budgets ensure that Public is able to fund 
the efficient level of effort outside the WUI. 
 
Impact of Policy.  From a societal perspective, budget constraints and regulations for Public actions 
in the WUI create two issues:  potential under protection of resources outside of the WUI for which 
Public is solely responsible; and an inability to attain the social optimum in the WUI due to the free-  24
riding problem.  HFRA prioritizes the WUI and requires that at least fifty-percent of fuel reduction 
budgets be spent in the WUI.  This rule creates inefficiencies because it does not allow public land 
managers to compare the MNB of fuel reduction effort in the WUI to MNB outside the WUI; it 
simply requires spending in the WUI.  Not only might Public effort be better spent outside the WUI, 
each additional unit of Public effort in the WUI increases Private’s ability to free ride and so does 
not necessarily result in an increase in the total amount of effort in the WUI. 
 
A policy that focuses fuel reduction effort in the WUI will be most inefficient when Public would 
otherwise choose to allocate its budget outside the WUI, such as when Public amenity value outside 
the WUI is high.  This might be the case in areas where there are endangered species, unique 
ecosystems or high-value watershed services, and the Public budget is small.  In general, when 
Public budgets are small, all funding increases will optimally be spent outside the WUI (as depicted 
in Figure 9 for budgets less than two), leaving Private as the sole contributor to fuel reduction effort 
in the WUI.  This action would not be permitted under HFRA.  When HFRA is imposed on a 
landscape where both Public and Private are contributing to fuel reduction effort in the WUI, 
requiring an increase in Public effort moves the actors toward the extreme free riding equilibrium 
with Private effort falling to zero. 
 
Within the context of the model, limiting Private’s ability to free ride and improving Public’s ability 
to spend fuel reduction effort outside the WUI could be achieved through reducing Public liability, 
increasing the valuation of undervalued (or un-priced) amenities outside the WUI, or 
reducing/eliminating federal disaster relief.  If the players’ amenity values in the WUI are 
approximately equal, then Private’s ability to free ride is driven by Public liability in the WUI and 
low Public values outside the WUI.  Reducing Public liability in the WUI would reduce Public value 
thereby reducing Public’s optimal effort in the WUI.  Increasing amenity value outside the WUI 
would increase the incentive to spend fuel reduction effort outside the WUI and reduce Public’s 
optimal effort in the WUI.  Due to the strategic interaction inherent in the game, simply increasing 
Public’s budget will not necessarily increase fuel reduction effort outside the WUI not total effort 
within the WUI.   
   25
Looking outside the model, a strategy to limit Private’s ability to free ride and improve Public’s 
ability to effectively protect resource values outside the WUI would be to legally require a fixed 
amount of effort from Private.  This policy option would be similar in spirit to existing statutory law 
in Montana, Minnesota, New Mexico and Washington that require fuel reduction on private land 
(Yoder et al. 2004).  Such policies might be especially appropriate in areas where public land 
managers face limited budgets. 
 
VI. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we identify the equilibria that emerge in a game of strategic interaction between a 
public land manager and a private land owner in their choice of fuel reduction effort.  We find that 
increasing the public land manager’s spending on fuel reduction effort in the WUI increases private 
land owner’s ability to free ride and may result in inefficiently low levels of total fuel reduction 
effort in the WUI, and leave public resources outside the WUI under-protected.  The current 
government policy of focusing fire risk mitigating activities in the WUI increases Private’s ability to 
free ride and diverts funding that might otherwise be used to protect resources outside the WUI.  
Federal disaster relief reduces Private’s incentive for fuel reduction and further enables Private’s free 
riding. 
 
HFRA’s emphasis on the WUI, public liability for losses on private land, and federal disaster aid all 
protect private landowners from losses in the WUI.  In that protection, each policy reduces the action 
taken by the private actors and puts that responsibility on public actors.  Such a shift in burden may 
be desirable from a broader social perspective or from a political perspective but the cost in terms of 
other projects such as protecting non-WUI resources should be acknowledged.  Without removing 
this safety net, policies that require private risk mitigating activities could reduce the public burden 
and increase social welfare.  This analysis focuses on only one slice in time but the implicit subsidy 
to private landowners creates both near-term inefficiencies such as unprotected non-WUI resources 
and long-term inefficiencies such as inducing socially undesirable levels of migration to the WUI.  
This analysis calls for a recognition of the fact that public and private values in the WUI can be 
protected by both public and private actors, but outside the WUI Public alone is responsible for the 
protection of the resource values.  26
 
 
Table 2: Equilibrium Fuel Reduction Effort 
    Private Effort in the WUI  Public effort in the WUI  Pu
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